Exploiting Lack of Hardware Reciprocity for Sender-Node Authentication
  at the PHY Layer by Rahman, Muhammad Mahboob Ur & Yasmeen, Aneela
Exploiting Lack of Hardware Reciprocity for
Sender-Node Authentication at the PHY Layer
Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman∗, Aneela Yasmeen†∗Electrical engineering department, Information Technology University (ITU), Lahore, Pakistan
mahboob.rahman@itu.edu.pk
†Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm university, Stockholm, Sweden
u04181@yahoo.com
Abstract—This paper proposes to exploit the so-called reci-
procity parameters (modelling non-reciprocal communication
hardware) to use them as decision metric for binary hypothesis
testing based authentication framework at a receiver node Bob.
Specifically, Bob first learns the reciprocity parameters of the
legitimate sender Alice via initial training. Then, during the test
phase, Bob first obtains a measurement of reciprocity parameters
of channel occupier (Alice, or, the intruder Eve). Then, with
ground truth and current measurement both in hand, Bob
carries out the hypothesis testing to automatically accept (reject)
the packets sent by Alice (Eve). For the proposed scheme, we
provide its success rate (the detection probability of Eve), and
its performance comparison with other schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer authentication is a well-studied problem
within the domain of Physical-layer security. There, the task of
a receiver node Bob is to exploit some attribute of the physical
layer (wireless medium or communication hardware) to use it
as sender’s fingerprint in order to accept (reject) the packets
coming from the legitimate sender Alice (the intruder Eve)
systematically. So far, researchers have considered channel
frequency response (CFR) [1], channel impulse response (CIR)
[2],[3], carrier frequency offset (CFO) [4],[5], angle-of-arrival
(AoA) [6], IQ-imbalance [7], received signal strength (RSS)
[8] etc. to use them as sender’s fingerprints for authentication.
The schemes proposed in [1]-[8] all share a common frame-
work for authentication. That is, Bob first acquires the ground
truth via training with Alice on a secure channel; then later
during the test phase, Bob authenticates every packet received
from the shared channel by doing hypothesis testing on current
measurement of sender’s fingerprint against the ground truth.
Table 1, on last page, provides a qualitative comparison of
schemes in [1]-[8] as well as the proposed scheme.
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the proposed
reciprocity-based authentication method conceptually differs
from the RF fingerprinting based authentication methods (e.g.,
[9]) as well as channel based authentication methods (e.g.,
[1]). Specially, RF fingerprinting based methods (e.g., [9])
exploit non-ideal characteristics of individual components
of communication hardware, e.g., ADC, power amplifiers
etc. Contrary to such methods, the proposed method neither
measures nor exploits the individual values of reciprocity
parameters. Rather the proposed method carries out two-way
message exchange between a node pair to compute the so-
called residual channel (which is non-zero due to the fact
that communication hardware is not reciprocal even when the
radio channel is); the residual channel then acts as transmitter
fingerprint. Next, even though the proposed method measures
the device-to-device channel in both directions (while channel
based methods, e.g., [1], record the channel frequency/impulse
response in one direction only), the RF channels in both
directions cancel each other due to reciprocity; therefore, the
actual transmitter fingerprint utilized by the proposed method
is the residual channel, and not the RF channel itself.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are the
following: i) proposal as well as algorithmic solution to exploit
reciprocity parameters as device fingerprint for sender-node
authentication, ii) performance analysis of proposed scheme
(i.e., probability of detection of Eve). Furthermore, the pro-
posed two-way message exchange protocol, the so-called ping-
pong iteration (see section III-A), for sender’s device finger-
print acquisition lends the proposed method readily available
for integration into challenge-response based Authorization
systems [10]. Additionally, the proposed method also finds its
application in transmitter identification problem [9], intrusion
detection problem [11] and two-way authentication problem.
Notations. (.)∗ denotes complex-conjugate operation; (.)H
denotes the hermitian-transpose operation; ∥.∥ denotes the 2-
norm; IK denotes a size K ×K identity matrix; E(.) denotes
the expectation operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A. System Model
We consider a narrow-band, time division duplex (TDD)
system where the sender nodes transmit on a shared, time-
slotted, block fading channel. Specifically, Alice and Bob
make a legitimate transmit-receive pair whereas Eve is an
active intruder whose objective is to impersonate Alice (see
Fig. 1). In other words, whenever Alice is absent, Eve sends
malicious data to Bob and strives to make Bob believe that
she is indeed Alice. Inline with previous literature [1]-[8], we
assume the following: i) Eve is a strong adversary who could
easily learn about presence/absence of Alice (e.g., by means
of spectrum sensing) in the beginning of every time-slot; ii)
Eve, being a clever impersonator (and not a mere jammer),
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tends to avoid collisions on the shared channel so as to stay
undetected.
Fig. 1. System model
B. Background: Non-reciprocal Communication Hardware
Reciprocity parameters (RP) model the non-reciprocal na-
ture of the factory-manufactured wireless communication
hardware; and therefore, are device-dependent and unique.
There are two RPs per device, one for each of the RF chains
[12]. RPs arise due to different amount of magnitude and phase
distortion caused by the RF Tx chain and RF Rx chain of a
communication device. RPs are relatively time-invariant due to
their temperature-dependent nature. To date, there is no known
wireless device which comes with reciprocal hardware [12]. It
is then the non-reciprocal hardware which makes the device-
to-device channel non-reciprocal, even when the radio channel
itself is reciprocal.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed method consists of two steps: i) acquisition
of sender’s device fingerprint, ii) hypothesis testing for au-
thentication. Additionally, whenever the reciprocity parameters
change, Bob updates its estimate of ground truth (aka finger-
print of Alice) via training with Alice on a secure channel.
A. Acquisition of Sender’s Device Fingerprint
This step consists of a ping-pong iteration between Bob
and sender node followed by least squares (LS) estimation of
sender’s device fingerprint.
1) Ping-Pong Iteration between Bob and Sender Node:
During every time-slot, Bob broadcasts a ping preamble xB
with power PB on the shared channel. This ping message
could be the response to an earlier channel access request by
the sender node (Alice or Eve). Then, the signal yS received
by the sender node S (S ∈ {A ≡ Alice,E ≡ Eve}) is:
yS = √PBhBS .xB + nS (1)
where nS ∼ CN (0, σ2S) is the noise at the sender S and
hBS = hTxB .hcBS .hRxS . exp{j(2pifBSt + φBS)} (2)
is the effective directional channel from Bob to S [12]. hBS
includes the radio channel hcBS , reciprocity parameters h
Tx
B ,
hRxS of Bob and S (see Fig. 2), and frequency and phase
offsets fBS , φBS (due to oscillators’ mismatch). Assuming
that hcBS ∼ CN (0,1), we get hBS ∼ CN (0, ∣hTxB .hRxS ∣2).
Next, S immediately echoes-back the received signal yS
as a pong message to Bob using amplify-and-forward (AF)
relaying1. This ensures that the ping-pong iteration takes place
in a time interval much shorter than the channel coherence
interval for the given environment. Then, zB∣S , to be read as
”signal received by Bob due to transmission by sender S”, is
given as:
zB∣S = βSB .hSB .yS + nB (3)
where nB ∼ CN (0, σ2B) is the noise at Bob and
hSB = hTxS .hcSB .hRxB . exp{j(2pifSBt + φSB)} (4)
is the effective directional channel from S to Bob (see
Fig. 2). Assuming that hcSB ∼ CN (0,1), we get hSB ∼CN (0, ∣hTxS .hRxB ∣2). Moreover, βSB is a scaling factor used
by S so as to satisfy the transmit power constraint:
βSB = ¿ÁÁÀ PS
PB . ∣hBS ∣2 + σ2S (5)
We first note that hcSB = (hcBS)∗, fSB = −fBS , φSB =−φBS (assuming negligible oscillator drift during the ping-
pong iteration). Then, plugging (1),(2),(4) into (3) yields:
zB∣S = √PB .βSB .hTxS .hRxB .hTxB .hRxS .xB + nB∣S (6)
where nB∣S = βSB .hSB .nS + nB is the net noise at Bob;
nB∣S ∼ CN (0, σ2B∣S) where σ2B∣S = β2SB .∣hSB ∣2.σ2S + σ2B . Let
h˜SB = hTxS .hRxB .hTxB .hRxS . Then, h˜SB is the so-called residual
channel, basically a complex scalar which contains all the four
reciprocity parameters (between Bob and S). In the proposed
method, h˜SB serves as device fingerprint of S; therefore, Bob
needs to estimate h˜SB from zB∣S . Then:
zAFB∣S = √PB .βSB .h˜SB .xB + nB∣S (7)
When S employs decode-and-forward (DF) relaying, it
constructs the pong message by pre-multiplying the known
xB
2 with hBS (perfectly) estimated from (1) and applies the
gain
√
PS . Bob then receives the following:
zDFB∣S = √PS .h˜SB .xB + nB (8)
Fig. 2. Ping-pong message exchange between Bob and Alice.
1The pong response by Eve (to ping message by Bob) during the test phase
should not be considered as an act of cooperation by Eve. Rather, it is part of
the proposed protocol; therefore, Eve must abide by the protocol if she wants
to intrude into the system while staying undetected. Such two-way message
exchange is common in cryptography-based Authorization systems [10].
2The preamble xB is not known (known) to sender nodes, i.e., Alice and
Eve, when they do AF (DF) relaying to generate the pong message.
2) Least Squares Estimation of Sender’s Fingerprint: In
order to estimate the fingerprint h˜SB of S, Bob sends out K
training symbols xB = [x1B , ..., xKB ]T in the ping preamble; S
then echoes-back (via AF/DF relaying) with a pong message.
Then, we rewrite (7),(8) in vector form as:
zAFB∣S = √PB .βSB .h˜SB .xB + nB∣S (9)
zDFB∣S = √PS .h˜SB .xB + nB (10)
where nB∣S ∼ CN (0, σ2nB∣SIK). Let x˜AFB∣S = √PB .βSB .xB ,
x˜DFB∣S = √PS .xB . Then, Bob obtains the two LS estimates:
h˜AFSB = (x˜AFB∣S)HzAFB∣S∥x˜AF
B∣S∥2 ; h˜DFSB =
(x˜DFB∣S)HzDFB∣S∥x˜DF
B∣S∥2 (11)
where h˜AFSB ∼ CN (h˜SB ,ΣAFB∣S), h˜DFSB ∼ CN (h˜SB ,ΣDFB∣S) with
ΣAFB∣S = σ2B∣SKPBβ2SB and ΣDFB∣S = σ2BKPS .
B. Hypothesis Testing for Authentication
Let pR ≐ h˜RSB (R ∈ {AF,DF}), µA ≐ h˜AB and µE ≐ h˜EB .
Bob utilizes the LS estimate of sender’s fingerprint from (11)
to cast the sender-node authentication problem as a binary
hypothesis testing problem:⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩H0 ∶ p
R = h˜AB + RB∣A
H1 ∶ pR = h˜EB + RB∣E (12)
where RB∣S ∼ CN (0,ΣRB∣S) is the estimation error. Then
pR∣H0 ∼ CN (µA,ΣRB∣A) and pR∣H1 ∼ CN (µE ,ΣRB∣E). If
H0 = 1 (H1 = 1), received data is accepted (rejected).
Next, since µA is available (due to initial training), Bob
applies the following test:
TR = ∣pR − µA∣ H1≷
H0
δR (13)
where δR, the decision threshold, is a design parameter.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
Implementation of the hypothesis test in (13) requires a
suitably chosen value of the design parameter δR. This work
computes δR by following the Neyman-Pearson procedure,
i.e., the probability of false alarm Pfa is set to a desired
(error tolerance) value to compute δR. More precisely, let
qR = pR − µA. Then, qR∣H0 ∼ CN (0,ΣRB∣A). Then, the test
statistic TR∣H0 ∼ Rayleigh(ρ = √ΣRB∣A/2). Then:
Pfa = Pr(∣qR∣ > δR∣H0) = exp(−(δR)2
ΣR
B∣A ) (14)
By setting Pfa to a pre-specified value, δR is calculated as:
δR = √−(ln(Pfa))(ΣRB∣A) (15)
Corollary 1. When sender nodes do AF relaying, δAF ≐ Y
in (15) is then a random variable with probability den-
sity function: fY (y, λ, c) = 2λ.y exp{−λ(y2 − c)}; y ≥ √c
(which is quite similar to Rayleigh distribution); where λ =
K.PB− ln(Pfa).σ2A.γ¯AB where γ¯AB is the average SNR of link
between Alice and Bob, and c = − ln(Pfa).σ2B
K.PB .β2AB
. Then:
δˆAF = E(δAF ) = 1γ¯AB .( σ2Bσ2A.β2AB ) + 1
1
γ¯AB
.( K.PB− ln(Pfa).σ2A ) (16)
Remark 1. (15) signifies that the computation of δR re-
quires knowledge of the variance ΣRB∣A. Then, following two
distinct cases are visible: i) when sender nodes employ DF
relaying to generate pong message, ΣDFB∣A is deterministic and
known to Bob, then (15) holds; ii) when sender nodes employ
AF relaying, either Bob knows hAB (and hence ΣAFB∣A), then
(15) holds; or, Bob knows only the distribution of ΣAFB∣A, then,
Bob could make the following approximation: δAF ≈ δˆAF
(i.e., Bob substitutes δˆAF from (16) as δAF in (13)). In short,
for the proposed method to work, only knowledge about the
channel/pathloss between Alice and Bob is required.
The proposed method is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The proposed method.
Phase-I: training //H0 = 1
Bob does one or more ping-pong iterations with Alice to
estimate the ground truth µA via (11).
Phase-II: Authentication //Done every time-slot.
1) Bob does one ping-pong iteration with channel occupant
to compute the current measurement pR via (11).
2) Bob computes the threshold δR via (15) or (16).
3) Bob implements the test in (13) to accept/reject packets.
//Redo Phase-I,II when reciprocity parameters change.
V. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
A. Success Probability of Eve
The detection accuracy of any hypothesis test (including
(13)) is fully characterized by two kinds of detection errors:
i) probability of false alarm Pfa (declaring H1 = 1, while
in reality H0 = 1), ii) probability of missed detection Pmd
(declaring H0 = 1, while in reality H1 = 1). Since this work
follows Neyman-Pearson procedure to compute δR in (15),
the detection accuracy of the test then solely depends on the
success probability (probability of missed detection) of Eve:
PRmd = Pr(∣qR∣ < δR∣H1) (17)
Let vT = ∣µE − µA∣, σT = √ΣRB∣E/2. Then, test statistic
TR∣H1 ∼ Rice(vT , σT ) and:
PRmd = 1 −Q1(vT /σT , δR/σT ) (18)
Let a = vT /σT , b = δR/σT . Then Q1(a, b) is the first-order
Marcum Q-function:
Q1(a, b) = ∫ ∞
b
x exp( − x2 + a2
2
)I0(ax)dx (19)
where I0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind of
zero order. A closed-form solution of (19) cannot be obtained;
however, its analytical approximations do exist (see, e.g., [13]).
Remark 2. (18) is usually solved offline, i.e., before the
authentication phase commences. But solving (18) requires
knowledge about Eve’s fingerprint µE as well as ΣRB∣E (or,
equivalently, knowledge of a and b) which may not be avail-
able prior to test phase. One way to address this problem is
to assume that: A1) the unknown fingerprint µE ∼ CN (1,1),
A2) the distribution of ΣRB∣E (i.e., average SNR γ¯EB of the
link between Eve and Bob) is known to Bob3. With this, the
approach taken is to substitute a by E(a) ≐ aˆ and b by E(b) ≐ bˆ
in (19) whenever realization(s) a and/or b are not available:
Q1(a, b) ≈ Q1(aˆ, bˆ) = ∫ ∞
bˆ
x exp( − x2 + aˆ2
2
)I0(aˆx)dx
(20)
Below, two corollaries describe solution of (18) for the two
cases of DF relaying and AF relaying by the sender nodes.
Corollary 2. When sender nodes do DF relaying, due to
A1, a = vT /σT ∼ Rice(va, σa) where v2a = (1 − µA,x√ΣDF
B∣E/2)2 +
µ2A,y
ΣDF
B∣E/2 , σ2a = 1ΣDFB∣E and µA = µA,x + iµA,y , while b is
deterministic and known to Bob. Then, Bob could substitute
a by E(a) ≐ aˆ to compute (18) where:
E(a) ≐ aˆ = σa√pi/2.L1/2(−v2a/2σ2a) (21)
where L1/2(x) = ex/2{(1 − x).I0(−x/2) − x.I1(−x/2)} is the
Laguerre polynomial, I0 (I1) is modified Bessel function of
the first kind and zero order (first order).
Corollary 3. When sender nodes do AF relaying, a =
vT /σT , b = δAF /σT are both random variables whose dis-
tributions are difficult to find. However, note that vT ∼
Rice(vv, σv) where v2v = (1 − µA,x)2 + µ2A,y , σ2v = 1. Also,
σT has the probability density function: fσT (σT , η, d) =
2η.σT exp{−η(σ2T − d)}; σT ≥ √d where η = 2K.PBσ2
E
.γ¯EB
where
d = σ2B
2K.PB .β2EB
. Finally, the distribution of δAF is given
in Corollary 1. Then, one can make use of the follow-
ing approximation (thanks to first-order Taylor expansion):
E(R/S) ≈ E(R)/E(S), for random variables R, S. Then:
aˆ = E(a) ≈ E(vT )/E(σT ); bˆ = E(b) ≈ E(δAF )/E(σT ) (22)
where E(vT ) = σv√pi/2.L1/2(−v2v/2σ2v), E(σT ) =
1
γ¯EB
.( σ2B
σ2
E
.β2
EB
)+1
1
γ¯EB
.( 2K.PB
σ2
E
) and E(δAF ) is given in (16). Then, Bob
could substitute a, b by aˆ, bˆ from (22) to compute (18).
B. Performance Comparison with Other Schemes
Table I provides a qualitative comparison of proposed
scheme with previous schemes [1]-[8].
3In other words, γ¯EB is varied over a range (say, 0 − 30 dB), and
accordingly, a set of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots is obtained.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Fig. 3 plots the ROC curves for the proposed scheme
when sender nodes do AF relaying and when Bob knows: i)
actual realization of ΣAFB∣A, ii) only distribution of ΣAFB∣A. Fig.3
suggests that the average performance loss, when Algorithm
1 operates only on statistical CSI of Alice, diminishes with
increase in set-point Pfa. Fig. 3 also highlights that the
detection performance of proposed scheme increases with an
increase in operational SNRs PB , PA, PE of the system.
Fig. 4 plots again the ROC curves and conveys the following
information: i) DF relaying by the sender nodes outperforms
the AF relaying policy, ii) detection performance of the pro-
posed scheme is comparable to that of CFO based scheme [4],
iii) the approximation in Corollary 3 is pessimistic (however,
the gap between the approximation in Corollary 3 and (18)
diminishes as the set-point Pfa increases).
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VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a reciprocity based, sender-node authentica-
tion scheme whose detection performance is comparable to
previous schemes, and is light-weight in terms of training
needs. Moreover, when implementing the proposed scheme
at the sender nodes, DF relaying policy is to be preferred over
AF relaying policy.
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TABLE I
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PHY LAYER AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
Device fingerprint Training needs Strength against forgery Scenario Mobility support System needs
reciprocity (this work) every several secs [12] high LoS/NLoS low-to-medium TDD system
CFR [1], CIR [2],[3] every channel coherence interval high (with iid channels) NLoS low-to-medium wideband system
RSS [8] every channel coherence interval low (Tx power attack) NLoS low-to-medium none
IQ imbalance [7] every several seconds high LoS/NLoS any none
AoA [6] when nodes move high LoS any multiple antennas at Rx
CFO [4],[5] one time [5], every several seconds [4] low (freq. translate attack) LoS/NLoS any none
